First of all, I wish to apologize to our readers for my prolonged absence from this space we share, which was due to unforeseen circumstances beyond my control. But I intend to keep a regularity of my contributions, which I am sure will serve as a stimulus for extensive discussions between all of us who share a keen interest for psychoanalytic field theories.
I have received several comments to my first blog post, and I have given each one an answer. But there is one comment I would like to discuss in extenso. It was not posted here, but on two of the mailing lists to which I had sent a communication about the launching of the blog. These are the Forum of the Group-Analytic Association International and the Group Psychotherapy List convened and coordinated by Haim Weinberg. The author of this comment is my dear friend Earl Hopper. He is a sociologist, psychotherapist, group analyst, and psychoanalyst, living and practicing in London. He is also a gifted teacher, a prolific writer, and the leader of an international research group focused on the inquiry of the Social Unconscious, in which I also participate.
I shall reproduce his comment here, and then discuss and reflect about it.
“Dear Juan,
“This is very good news. I really welcome your new blog and I will try to follow the various contributions to it. Meanwhile, I would draw your attention to the Introduction to The Social Unconscious in Persons, Groups and Societies: Volume 2: Mainly Foundation Matrices, edited by Haim Weinberg and myself (2015). In this Introduction we outline the elements and dimensions of the group analytic (Foulkesian) field theory of the social unconscious. In my various lectures on the field theory of the social unconscious I also focus on the importance of taking a ‘dynamic open social system’ perspective towards persons and their groupings, as well as on processes of personification and valence. Incidentally, in his first publications Foulkes referred favourably to Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory (1951). The key theme in discussions of field theory is the difficulty that psychoanalysts have in recognising what Durkheim called a ‘social fact’. To my continuing surprise many group analysts also have this difficulty, as seen in their tendency to refer, for example, to the social unconscious of a society, rather than to a culture of a society of which its members are unconscious. Social systems can be said to have an “unconscious mind” only under very special circumstances, such as extensive regression as a consequence of massive social trauma. Do you agree?
“Yours,
“Earl
“Earl Hopper, Ph.D.”
This is my reply, which might also be of interest to you:
Dear Earl,
The concept of a “group mind” is one in which we have, as Tweedledum and Tweedledee, “agreed to disagree”, although our disagreement may be more a question of the language in which we frame our thinking, than a substantial difference. The problem is that, in English, “mind” is usually conceived as a functional entity, residing within the individual and an epiphenomenon of brain function. If you start from that assumption, the very concept of a “group mind” is utterly preposterous. This constitutes a major problem in James Strachey’s English version of Freud’s writings (the Standard Edition), which systematically translates as “mind” what the author had written, in the original German text, as Seele (“soul”) or Geist (“spirit”). This creates a more positivistic version of Freud, which eliminates the tension between his conscious purpose and ideal of having psychoanalysis become a natural science, “just like chemistry”, and the deep roots of his identification with German Romanticism, mainly through Goethe, that steered his revolutionary discovery, which would undermine the very bases of the positivistic and reduccionistic scientism he had received from his medical teachers.
Freudian metapsychology suffers from the unwarranted assumption of the initial existence of the isolated individual, who would only secondarily be forced, by dire organic necessity, to engage unwillingly in relations with other human beings. This being a consequence both of Descartes’s construction of the concept of the subject —which, although clearly undermined by Freud´s discovery of the unconscious, he never fully gave up— and his materialistic metaphysics, which led him to believe that only a human organism with a brain could be the “real” underlying basis of what we know as “mental processes”.
Some of Freud’s social writings —such as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and The Future of an Illusion (1927c) — have been sorely limited by this individualistic perspective, but others —mainly Totem and Taboo (1912–1913) and Moses and Monotheism (1939a) — introduced and explored the concept of collective mental processes, which could pave the way for a completely different way of conceiving Mind (Hernández de Tubert, 2008). (And I am using here the capitalized term “Mind”, in order to refer of a much wider conception of Seele and Geist, which should transcend the unavoidable limitations of the individualistic and materialistic concept of “mind” as an epiphenomenon of brain function.)
Indeed, the collective mental processes explored by Freud —such as that of a transgenerational cultural evolution— may be shown to have all the characteristics of those he studied in the case of individuals —explicit, implicit, and repressed intentionality and meaning, conflict, transactional products, defensive strategies, and the whole underlying dynamic and logic of unconscious thinking—, with one major exception: collective mental processes lack the feeling of “I-ness” and personal agency of the individual experience of him or herself. This is equivalent to say that such processes do not have a subject, if “subject” is to be defined as the personal experience of selfhood. So that collective mental processes —I don’t quite like, just as you, the term “group mind”, on account of its functionalist and materialist connotations— should be studied in themselves, and not as an extension of individual mental processes.
Now, any serious attempt to conduct and think-through the experience of group analysis should attempt to account for the collective mental processes that emerge in the group situation under study. And this is where Field Theory comes to the fore. If we shift our way of looking at and listening to whatever happens in a group, from focusing on the individual participants to attempting to perceive and consider the total situation, we are already using an as yet unformulated form of field theory. It is a reversal of perspective, between Figure and Ground, as it was studied by the Gestalt psychology theoreticians (Koller, Koffka, Goldstein, and others).
In the case of S. H. Foulkes (1948, 1964, 1975, 1990) in Britain, his field theory took the form of the Network and the Matrix. In this he followed his teacher of neurology, Kurt Goldstein, who conceived the nervous system as a hyper-complex network of neural relations, in which the individual neurons were its nodal points, and the behavior of the system depended, not only on the integrity and function of the whole network, but also on that of a larger system of connections that included the whole organism and its relations with other living beings, persons, and society. For Foulkes, human life and experience were inherently social, and included all the intrapersonal, interpersonal and transpersonal relations that formed the complex network of human existence, and pathology was the result of a disturbance in this network. For the clinical application of such concept, he used the term Matrix. Now, the word “matrix”, on account of its connotations of mother, womb, and a surrounding substance that acts as a container, is a more relational term, while “network” is clearly structural. So, “matrix” seemed more adequate to describe what actually occurs when people meet, since Foulkes’s Matrix was anything but static, but rather a pulsating living entity —a psychological and social field.
It is true that Foulkes had a favorable impression on Kurt Lewin’s field theory, and the first edition of the book he wrote with James Anthony, called Group Psychotherapy: The Psychoanalytic Approach (1957), there was an ample reference to Lewin’s work, in an introductory chapter, written by Anthony. But in the second 1965 edition, the chapter was substantially rewritten, and the whole section on Lewin was omitted, since it seemed to imply that Foulkes had received his field concepts from him, while the truth is that both of them had been independently nurtured by the thought of the Gestalt theorists —in the case of Foulkes, through Kurt Goldstein, as already noted in my first blog entry. So, Lewin’s influence was then explicitly denied, although acknowledging their mutual affinity:
“We do not find that ‘group dynamics’ enter much into the small therapeutic group […]. If occasionally we use terms which are also used in K. Lewin’s work, they have a different connotation or dimension. For our orientation to the hospital ‘therapeutic community’ at Northfield, we found that our own group-analytic views married well with concepts used in ‘field theory’, and that the latter helped us in our orientation. Here belongs for instance the concept of a social ‘field’. Further, there is a common background in Gestalt psychology” (Foulkes & Anthony, 1965, p. 20).
In the case of the South American version of group analysis, Enrique Pichon-Rivière’s (1971; Tubert-Oklander and Hernández de Tubert, 2004) thought and practice, which was quite compatible with and yet different from Foulkes’s, had clearly been influenced by Lewin, whom he quoted frequently, and Sullivan. But this shall be the subject of another post.
Now, it soon became obvious that these field concepts did not only apply to multi-person groups or other collective entities, but also to the bi-personal “group” of the analytic situation. Such idea had been implicit in the concept of the unity of the transference-countertransference, ever since the seminal contributions of Sándor Ferenczi, all through the collective work and thinking of the British Independent Group of Object Relations Theory, and the pioneering studies of Heinrich Racker (1960) in Argentina. But it was Willy and Madeleine Baranger, two of Pichon-Rivière’s disciples, who formulated an in-depth conception of the psychoanalytic situation as a dynamic field. In their original 1961–1962 article they quoted Lewin’s field theory, but when they reprinted it in 1969 as a chapter of their book Problems of the Analytic Field, this reference had been changed to one to French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who had also incorporated the field concept from his deep knowledge and use of Gestalt psychology. An explicit reference remained, however, to group psychotherapy, obviously derived from their work with Pichon-Rivière. This work has been the fons et origo of one of the main contemporary psychoanalytic field theories.
I feel that it is a pity that the present movement of relational psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, which recognizes its origins in the pioneer work of Ferenczi, and the influence of Sullivan’s Interpersonal Psychoanalysis, the British Independent Group, the work of Heinrich Racker, Heinz Kohut’s Self Psychology, the contemporary studies of the mother-infant interaction, and feminist theory (Aron, 1996), has completely omitted the fact that many of their recent concepts, such as that of a “relational matrix”, had already been introduced by Group Analysis many decades ago. This I believe to be due to relative absence of a group-analytic orientation in analytic group psychotherapy in the US, and to the radical split that occurred between psychoanalysis and group analysis in the psychoanalytic community, a historical fact that surely needs to be studied in depth.
I shall have to leave for a further occasion the discussion of the relevance of social facts for psychoanalytic theory and practice, and their place in our field theory, as well as the revolutionary concept of the Social Unconscious, which is surely a field concept. For the time being, let this serve as an answer, a part of an ongoing dialogue that will surely stimulate further questionings from the readers of this blog.
Warmly,
Juan
Once again, I invite our readers to add their voices to this discussion, so that this blog may become a space for a fruitful interchange, rather than a one-way communication.
Mexico City, March 24, 2016.
REFERENCES
Aron, L. (1996). A Meeting of Minds: Mutuality in Psychoanalysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
Baranger, M. & Baranger, W. (1961–1962). La situación analítica como campo dinámico. Revista Uruguaya de Psicoanálisis, 4 (1): 3–54. [English translation: The analytic situation as a dynamic field. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 2008, 89: 795–826.]
Baranger, W. y Baranger, M. (1969). Problemas del campo psicoanalítico. [Problems of the psychoanalytic field.] Buenos Aires: Kargieman.
Foulkes, S. H. (1948). Introduction to Group-Analytic Psychotherapy: Studies in the Social Interaction of Individuals and Groups. London: Karnac, 1984. [Original publication, London: Heinemann.]
Foulkes, S. H. (1964). Therapeutic Group Analysis. London: Karnac, 1984. [Original publication, London: Allen & Unwin.]
Foulkes, S. H. (1975). Group-Analytic Psychotherapy: Method and Principles. London: Gordon & Breach. [Reprinted, London: Karnac, 2012.]
Foulkes, S. H. (1990). Selected Papers: Psychoanalysis and Group Analysis. London: Karnac.
Foulkes, S. H. & Anthony, E. J. (1957). Group Psychotherapy: The Psychoanalytic Approach, second edition. London: Penguin.
Foulkes, S. H. & Anthony, E. J. (1965). Group Psychotherapy: The Psychoanalytic Approach, second edition. London: Karnac, 1984.
Freud, S. (1912–1913). Totem and Taboo. S.E., 13: vii–162. London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1921c). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. S.E., 18: 65–144. London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1927c). The Future of an Illusion. S.E., 21: 1–56. London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1939a). Moses and Monotheism. S.E., 23: 1–138. London: Hogarth.
Hernández de Tubert, R. (2008). La antropología freudiana y la metasociología [Freudian anthropology and metasociology]. Revista de Psicoanálisis, 65: 29–56.
Hopper, E. & Weinberg, H. (Eds.) (2015). The Social Unconscious in Persons, Groups and Societies: Volume 2: Mainly Foundation Matrices. London: Karnac.
Lewin, K. (1951). Field Theory in Social Science. New York, NY: Harper.
Pichon-Rivière, E. (1971). El proceso grupal. Del psicoanálisis a la psicología social (I) [The group process: From psychoanalysis to social psychology (I)]. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
Racker, H. (1960). Estudios sobre técnica psicoanalítica [Studies on psychoanalytic technique]. Buenos Aires: Paidós. [English translation: Transference and Countertransference. London: Hogarth, 1988.]
Tubert-Oklander, J. & Hernández de Tubert, R (2004). Operative Groups: The Latin-American Approach to Group Analysis. London: Jessica Kingsley.
I have received several comments to my first blog post, and I have given each one an answer. But there is one comment I would like to discuss in extenso. It was not posted here, but on two of the mailing lists to which I had sent a communication about the launching of the blog. These are the Forum of the Group-Analytic Association International and the Group Psychotherapy List convened and coordinated by Haim Weinberg. The author of this comment is my dear friend Earl Hopper. He is a sociologist, psychotherapist, group analyst, and psychoanalyst, living and practicing in London. He is also a gifted teacher, a prolific writer, and the leader of an international research group focused on the inquiry of the Social Unconscious, in which I also participate.
I shall reproduce his comment here, and then discuss and reflect about it.
“Dear Juan,
“This is very good news. I really welcome your new blog and I will try to follow the various contributions to it. Meanwhile, I would draw your attention to the Introduction to The Social Unconscious in Persons, Groups and Societies: Volume 2: Mainly Foundation Matrices, edited by Haim Weinberg and myself (2015). In this Introduction we outline the elements and dimensions of the group analytic (Foulkesian) field theory of the social unconscious. In my various lectures on the field theory of the social unconscious I also focus on the importance of taking a ‘dynamic open social system’ perspective towards persons and their groupings, as well as on processes of personification and valence. Incidentally, in his first publications Foulkes referred favourably to Kurt Lewin’s Field Theory (1951). The key theme in discussions of field theory is the difficulty that psychoanalysts have in recognising what Durkheim called a ‘social fact’. To my continuing surprise many group analysts also have this difficulty, as seen in their tendency to refer, for example, to the social unconscious of a society, rather than to a culture of a society of which its members are unconscious. Social systems can be said to have an “unconscious mind” only under very special circumstances, such as extensive regression as a consequence of massive social trauma. Do you agree?
“Yours,
“Earl
“Earl Hopper, Ph.D.”
This is my reply, which might also be of interest to you:
Dear Earl,
The concept of a “group mind” is one in which we have, as Tweedledum and Tweedledee, “agreed to disagree”, although our disagreement may be more a question of the language in which we frame our thinking, than a substantial difference. The problem is that, in English, “mind” is usually conceived as a functional entity, residing within the individual and an epiphenomenon of brain function. If you start from that assumption, the very concept of a “group mind” is utterly preposterous. This constitutes a major problem in James Strachey’s English version of Freud’s writings (the Standard Edition), which systematically translates as “mind” what the author had written, in the original German text, as Seele (“soul”) or Geist (“spirit”). This creates a more positivistic version of Freud, which eliminates the tension between his conscious purpose and ideal of having psychoanalysis become a natural science, “just like chemistry”, and the deep roots of his identification with German Romanticism, mainly through Goethe, that steered his revolutionary discovery, which would undermine the very bases of the positivistic and reduccionistic scientism he had received from his medical teachers.
Freudian metapsychology suffers from the unwarranted assumption of the initial existence of the isolated individual, who would only secondarily be forced, by dire organic necessity, to engage unwillingly in relations with other human beings. This being a consequence both of Descartes’s construction of the concept of the subject —which, although clearly undermined by Freud´s discovery of the unconscious, he never fully gave up— and his materialistic metaphysics, which led him to believe that only a human organism with a brain could be the “real” underlying basis of what we know as “mental processes”.
Some of Freud’s social writings —such as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and The Future of an Illusion (1927c) — have been sorely limited by this individualistic perspective, but others —mainly Totem and Taboo (1912–1913) and Moses and Monotheism (1939a) — introduced and explored the concept of collective mental processes, which could pave the way for a completely different way of conceiving Mind (Hernández de Tubert, 2008). (And I am using here the capitalized term “Mind”, in order to refer of a much wider conception of Seele and Geist, which should transcend the unavoidable limitations of the individualistic and materialistic concept of “mind” as an epiphenomenon of brain function.)
Indeed, the collective mental processes explored by Freud —such as that of a transgenerational cultural evolution— may be shown to have all the characteristics of those he studied in the case of individuals —explicit, implicit, and repressed intentionality and meaning, conflict, transactional products, defensive strategies, and the whole underlying dynamic and logic of unconscious thinking—, with one major exception: collective mental processes lack the feeling of “I-ness” and personal agency of the individual experience of him or herself. This is equivalent to say that such processes do not have a subject, if “subject” is to be defined as the personal experience of selfhood. So that collective mental processes —I don’t quite like, just as you, the term “group mind”, on account of its functionalist and materialist connotations— should be studied in themselves, and not as an extension of individual mental processes.
Now, any serious attempt to conduct and think-through the experience of group analysis should attempt to account for the collective mental processes that emerge in the group situation under study. And this is where Field Theory comes to the fore. If we shift our way of looking at and listening to whatever happens in a group, from focusing on the individual participants to attempting to perceive and consider the total situation, we are already using an as yet unformulated form of field theory. It is a reversal of perspective, between Figure and Ground, as it was studied by the Gestalt psychology theoreticians (Koller, Koffka, Goldstein, and others).
In the case of S. H. Foulkes (1948, 1964, 1975, 1990) in Britain, his field theory took the form of the Network and the Matrix. In this he followed his teacher of neurology, Kurt Goldstein, who conceived the nervous system as a hyper-complex network of neural relations, in which the individual neurons were its nodal points, and the behavior of the system depended, not only on the integrity and function of the whole network, but also on that of a larger system of connections that included the whole organism and its relations with other living beings, persons, and society. For Foulkes, human life and experience were inherently social, and included all the intrapersonal, interpersonal and transpersonal relations that formed the complex network of human existence, and pathology was the result of a disturbance in this network. For the clinical application of such concept, he used the term Matrix. Now, the word “matrix”, on account of its connotations of mother, womb, and a surrounding substance that acts as a container, is a more relational term, while “network” is clearly structural. So, “matrix” seemed more adequate to describe what actually occurs when people meet, since Foulkes’s Matrix was anything but static, but rather a pulsating living entity —a psychological and social field.
It is true that Foulkes had a favorable impression on Kurt Lewin’s field theory, and the first edition of the book he wrote with James Anthony, called Group Psychotherapy: The Psychoanalytic Approach (1957), there was an ample reference to Lewin’s work, in an introductory chapter, written by Anthony. But in the second 1965 edition, the chapter was substantially rewritten, and the whole section on Lewin was omitted, since it seemed to imply that Foulkes had received his field concepts from him, while the truth is that both of them had been independently nurtured by the thought of the Gestalt theorists —in the case of Foulkes, through Kurt Goldstein, as already noted in my first blog entry. So, Lewin’s influence was then explicitly denied, although acknowledging their mutual affinity:
“We do not find that ‘group dynamics’ enter much into the small therapeutic group […]. If occasionally we use terms which are also used in K. Lewin’s work, they have a different connotation or dimension. For our orientation to the hospital ‘therapeutic community’ at Northfield, we found that our own group-analytic views married well with concepts used in ‘field theory’, and that the latter helped us in our orientation. Here belongs for instance the concept of a social ‘field’. Further, there is a common background in Gestalt psychology” (Foulkes & Anthony, 1965, p. 20).
In the case of the South American version of group analysis, Enrique Pichon-Rivière’s (1971; Tubert-Oklander and Hernández de Tubert, 2004) thought and practice, which was quite compatible with and yet different from Foulkes’s, had clearly been influenced by Lewin, whom he quoted frequently, and Sullivan. But this shall be the subject of another post.
Now, it soon became obvious that these field concepts did not only apply to multi-person groups or other collective entities, but also to the bi-personal “group” of the analytic situation. Such idea had been implicit in the concept of the unity of the transference-countertransference, ever since the seminal contributions of Sándor Ferenczi, all through the collective work and thinking of the British Independent Group of Object Relations Theory, and the pioneering studies of Heinrich Racker (1960) in Argentina. But it was Willy and Madeleine Baranger, two of Pichon-Rivière’s disciples, who formulated an in-depth conception of the psychoanalytic situation as a dynamic field. In their original 1961–1962 article they quoted Lewin’s field theory, but when they reprinted it in 1969 as a chapter of their book Problems of the Analytic Field, this reference had been changed to one to French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who had also incorporated the field concept from his deep knowledge and use of Gestalt psychology. An explicit reference remained, however, to group psychotherapy, obviously derived from their work with Pichon-Rivière. This work has been the fons et origo of one of the main contemporary psychoanalytic field theories.
I feel that it is a pity that the present movement of relational psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, which recognizes its origins in the pioneer work of Ferenczi, and the influence of Sullivan’s Interpersonal Psychoanalysis, the British Independent Group, the work of Heinrich Racker, Heinz Kohut’s Self Psychology, the contemporary studies of the mother-infant interaction, and feminist theory (Aron, 1996), has completely omitted the fact that many of their recent concepts, such as that of a “relational matrix”, had already been introduced by Group Analysis many decades ago. This I believe to be due to relative absence of a group-analytic orientation in analytic group psychotherapy in the US, and to the radical split that occurred between psychoanalysis and group analysis in the psychoanalytic community, a historical fact that surely needs to be studied in depth.
I shall have to leave for a further occasion the discussion of the relevance of social facts for psychoanalytic theory and practice, and their place in our field theory, as well as the revolutionary concept of the Social Unconscious, which is surely a field concept. For the time being, let this serve as an answer, a part of an ongoing dialogue that will surely stimulate further questionings from the readers of this blog.
Warmly,
Juan
Once again, I invite our readers to add their voices to this discussion, so that this blog may become a space for a fruitful interchange, rather than a one-way communication.
Mexico City, March 24, 2016.
REFERENCES
Aron, L. (1996). A Meeting of Minds: Mutuality in Psychoanalysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
Baranger, M. & Baranger, W. (1961–1962). La situación analítica como campo dinámico. Revista Uruguaya de Psicoanálisis, 4 (1): 3–54. [English translation: The analytic situation as a dynamic field. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 2008, 89: 795–826.]
Baranger, W. y Baranger, M. (1969). Problemas del campo psicoanalítico. [Problems of the psychoanalytic field.] Buenos Aires: Kargieman.
Foulkes, S. H. (1948). Introduction to Group-Analytic Psychotherapy: Studies in the Social Interaction of Individuals and Groups. London: Karnac, 1984. [Original publication, London: Heinemann.]
Foulkes, S. H. (1964). Therapeutic Group Analysis. London: Karnac, 1984. [Original publication, London: Allen & Unwin.]
Foulkes, S. H. (1975). Group-Analytic Psychotherapy: Method and Principles. London: Gordon & Breach. [Reprinted, London: Karnac, 2012.]
Foulkes, S. H. (1990). Selected Papers: Psychoanalysis and Group Analysis. London: Karnac.
Foulkes, S. H. & Anthony, E. J. (1957). Group Psychotherapy: The Psychoanalytic Approach, second edition. London: Penguin.
Foulkes, S. H. & Anthony, E. J. (1965). Group Psychotherapy: The Psychoanalytic Approach, second edition. London: Karnac, 1984.
Freud, S. (1912–1913). Totem and Taboo. S.E., 13: vii–162. London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1921c). Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. S.E., 18: 65–144. London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1927c). The Future of an Illusion. S.E., 21: 1–56. London: Hogarth.
Freud, S. (1939a). Moses and Monotheism. S.E., 23: 1–138. London: Hogarth.
Hernández de Tubert, R. (2008). La antropología freudiana y la metasociología [Freudian anthropology and metasociology]. Revista de Psicoanálisis, 65: 29–56.
Hopper, E. & Weinberg, H. (Eds.) (2015). The Social Unconscious in Persons, Groups and Societies: Volume 2: Mainly Foundation Matrices. London: Karnac.
Lewin, K. (1951). Field Theory in Social Science. New York, NY: Harper.
Pichon-Rivière, E. (1971). El proceso grupal. Del psicoanálisis a la psicología social (I) [The group process: From psychoanalysis to social psychology (I)]. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
Racker, H. (1960). Estudios sobre técnica psicoanalítica [Studies on psychoanalytic technique]. Buenos Aires: Paidós. [English translation: Transference and Countertransference. London: Hogarth, 1988.]
Tubert-Oklander, J. & Hernández de Tubert, R (2004). Operative Groups: The Latin-American Approach to Group Analysis. London: Jessica Kingsley.
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